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show that competition also positively affects stability. They find that the expansion of bank branching in the U.S. increased competition in the 1920s. The higher competition weeded out inefficient banks, which effectively made the banking system more stable (see also Berger and Hannan, 1998) . Similarly, Mester (1987) finds that greater multimarket contact among competing banks (an outcome of relaxed interstate branching) increases competition and benefits consumers.
It is clear that higher competition positively affects not only the efficiency of the banking industry, but also the productivity of the real economy. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) investigate increased competition in the U.S. triggered by the removal of bank-branching restrictions. They find that per capita growth in output and income increases significantly following deregulation of the banking industry. Evanoff and Ors (2008) evaluate the changes in cost efficiency after new bank competitors enter local markets. They show that incumbent banks adjust to the entry of a new bank by improving their cost efficiencies.
Several studies also predict that competition enhances bank monitoring and, consequently, credit allocation. Boot and Thakor (2000) argue, for example, that competition forces banks to focus on activities that are less prone to price competition, such as relationship banking. Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004) show that competition also increases sector specialization. Sector specialization helps banks escape price competition by investing in activities that allow them to get to know their borrowers better and offer tailor-made services. Degryse and Ongena (2007) provide empirical evidence that competition not only lowers interest rates for borrowers but also improves access to credit for informationally opaque borrowers.
2 They show that bank branches strengthen their relationships with borrowers when they face stronger competition. 
Competition and stability
Contradicting this notion that competition is good for the banking industry and the economy are several theoretical contributions showing that competition may expose banks to risk and therefore actually decrease stability in banking. For instance, Vives (2010) shows that higher competition 4 increases the probability of a bank run. If competition among banks is fierce, the study argues, banks have less of a cushion to mitigate excessive withdrawals. Vives suggests that regulators should strengthen banks' capital requirements when competition increases.
Competition could also increase risk-taking. Keeley (1990) , for example, argues that competition erodes the franchise value of a bank. A bank with little to lose is therefore encouraged to make big bets and search for profits through pronounced risk-taking. 4 Several empirical studies support this argument. Using data for the Spanish banking system, for instance, Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina Salas (2010) find that higher market power (using the Lerner index) decreases bank risktaking (measured by nonperforming commercial loan ratios). Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens (2010) find that this effect is strongest in countries with unconcentrated banking markets, stricter activity restrictions, and pronounced herding in revenue structure.
However, competition is not solely responsible for bank instability. Panic-based bank runs can occur in monopolistic banking environments, too (Chang and Velasco, 2001; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Boyd, De Nicolo, and Smith, 2004) . Recent theoretical studies even anticipate a positive relationship between competition and stability. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that competition lowers interest rates for bank loans, for example, which mitigates borrowers' moral-hazard behavior and makes lending safer. 5 Another argument is that competition helps strong banks gain market share (see Boot and Marinč, 2009) , and strong banks lead to a more stable banking system.
Empirical evidence also supports the positive relation between competition and stability. In a cross-country study, Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) find that, for banks, reductions in market power (measured by the Lerner index and HHI) are associated with lower risk exposure. Controlling for risk-taking, Schaeck and Čihák (2010) show that banks also hold higher levels of capital when competition (measured by Panzar and Rosse H-statistics) is strong. Conversely, they also show that limiting banking competition hampers banks' financial stability. Furthermore, Schaeck, Čihák, and Wolfe (2009) show that reducing competitive activity (measured by Panzar and Rosse H-statistics) increases the probability of crises. Similarly, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) find that economic crises are less likely in concentrated banking systems with fewer restrictions on bank 4 Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that deregulation and consequent higher competition encourage banks to loosen credit standards in order to fight for additional market share. This might result in a lending boom and (potentially) a banking crisis. Rice and Strahan (2010) empirically mitigate that concern. They find that relaxed intrastate branching in the U.S. increased competition; however, total lending to SMEs remained unchanged.
5 Wagner (2010) shows that Boyd and De Nicolo's (2005) effect overlooks the fact that banks can adjust their loan portfolios toward riskier borrowers.
5 competition (e.g., lower barriers to entry) and banking activities. These findings suggest that when national institutions encourage competition, they lower the probability of bank failure.
Overall, however, the relationship between competition and stability is inconclusive. Three main explanations exist. First, different studies use different proxies for competition. Concentration indexes such as the HHI index may not measure the competitive conduct of banks (see Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández, and Udell, 2009 ), for example. Competition between a few large banks may be fierce, whereas competition among many geographically separated small banks may be limited. The Lerner index and Panzar and Rosse H-statistics may therefore be better proxies to measure competitive bank activity.
Second, as Beck (2010) identified, most empirical studies evaluate periods of relative financial stability with pronounced consolidation trends. This jeopardizes the validity of those findings in times of global recession. That is, the positive effects of competition may prevail in normal times, but not necessarily in times of financial crisis.
Third, competition may strengthen the banking system more in the long run than in the short run. In the short run, changes in the competitive environment might cause instabilities because banks
have not yet adjusted to their new environments and the path to a new equilibrium entails risks (see also Vives, 2001 and Marinč, 2007) . In particular, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) show that liberalization negatively affects the stability of the banking system. They provide an important insight: the negative relation between liberalization and stability is weaker in countries with strong institutional environments. Countries with high corruption, low respect for the rule of law, and weak contract enforcement should therefore carefully introduce financial liberalization.
In summary, competition increases efficiency but not necessarily banking stability.
Competition authorities should apply competition policies relentlessly in times of financial stability; however, the EU should also strengthen its regulatory and legal environment to prevent evolutionary dynamics in banking from threatening economic fragility. In other words, stability in banking is preserved only if a strong institutional setting (e.g., low corruption, strong contract enforcement, and respect for the rule of law) supports competition.
Competition policy in banking: The EU approach
This section reviews the EU approach to competition policy in banking in times of financial stability, including cartel prevention, merger policy, and state-aid control.
Structural measures to enhance competition
Competition policy should move beyond blind implementation of rigid rules and instead focus on structural measures that enhance competition. Concentration indexes are not a perfect proxy for 6 competitive conduct, for example, and so competition policy cannot solely rely on cut-offs in concentration indexes. These normal tools are also imprecise because banks have difficult-to-define production functions, sell bundles of services, and are riddled with network externalities (Claessens, 2009 ).
Structural configurations are a better way to define the level of competitive conduct in banking. In the EU, competition policy focuses on leveling the playing field, ensuring free entry and exit, and establishing a contestable institutional environment with equal access to common services for all banks. However, Europe still does not have a common market for financial services. Regulatory practices and legal frameworks across the EU countries need to be further harmonized. The biggest challenges lie in coordinating its national supervisory bodies and governments, bank-closure mechanisms, deposit-insurance schemes, tax systems, and extensive government guarantees.
The European Commission has evaluated competitive concerns in the retail banking sector's markets for payment systems, payment cards, and retail banking products (EC, 2007) . The evaluation found highly concentrated markets for payment systems and payment cards in several EU countries, as well as large variations in merchant fees and interchange fees, and high and sustained profitability in card issuing. The study also identified several practices that create barriers to entry in retail-banking product markets, particularly exclusions from existing credit registries and from cooperation among banks. Banks also engaged in product tying and deterred customer mobility (e.g., costs to switch accounts).
Banking regulators and competition authorities should work to lower these barriers to entry in the EU banking system. In particular, they should reduce customers' switching costs. One way may be through account-number portability (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011). This used to be prohibitively expensive, but the costs may substantially decline due to IT and payment-system developments. For example, large and small banks could share information through information exchanges. Banks could also share risk-management systems, cash handling, and payment-system products (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011). These actions may lower the barriers to entry for small banks in particular. Banks compete and cooperate in multiple markets and business segments. They should also cooperate to establish common services (e.g., payment and processing infrastructure 7 ), exchange information through credit bureaus, and strengthen public confidence in the financial system-all important for quality bank operations and smooth operation of the entire economy. Some banks may still attempt to collude and engage in other practices with the sole purpose of limiting competition. Frequent cooperation across several activities may facilitate anti-competitive behavior due to the enhanced threat of retaliation in multiple markets (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) and better detection of defecting firms (Matsushima, 2001; Greve, 2008 If an agreement limits competition according to Article 101 of the TFEU, a bank can invoke Article 101(3) of the TFEU as a defense. In such a case, the competition authority weighs the procompetitive effects of an agreement as defined by Article 101(3) of the TFEU against the anticompetitive impact of the agreement-but only if four cumulative conditions hold: the agreement must lead to efficiency gains, the restrictions must be indispensable for the efficiency gains, the resulting benefits are largely passed on to consumers, and the agreement should not "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition for a substantial part of the products in 7 The SEPA case highlights the fine line between cooperation and collusion among banks when introducing common standards into payment and processing business. The European Commission opened an investigation into e-payment standardization processes that allegedly restrict competition (see IP/11/1076 IP/11/ , 26.9.2011 . It also proposed a regulation to foster the transition to the SEPA-compliant credit transfer and direct debit transactions (see OJ 94, 30.3.2012, p.22-37 
11
EU, in paragraph 89 of the horizontal merger guidelines, the European Commission endorses the failing-firm defense if "the deterioration of the competitive structure that follows the merger cannot be said to be caused by the merger." Mergers of this nature are further evaluated using three criteria from Paragraph 90: whether the firm would be forced out of the market if the merger does not occur, whether the merger is the least anti-competitive option, and whether the assets of the failing firm would exit the market in the absence of a merger.
In the last decade, we have witnessed a consolidation wave in European banking (see Figure   1 ). Initially, mergers predominantly occurred between domestic banks, pointing to economic nationalism among governments. Dinç and Erel (2010) provide empirical evidence that EU governments may have indeed supported domestic mergers and opposed foreign acquirers. However, in a few cases, the European Commission took a tough stance and cross-border mergers took place. However, several cases exist in which EU countries have tried to abuse the exemptions in merger control in order to defend national champions (see Gerard, 2008 
State-aid control
Multiple arguments point to the drawbacks of state aid and the need for state-aid control when it comes to the health of the EU banking industry. Direct or indirect state aid (such as implicit government guarantees for too-big-to-fail banks) may push banks to undertake otherwise unprofitable activities. As Ben Bernanke stated, "[h]aving institutions that are too big to fail also creates competitive inequities that may prevent our most productive and innovative firms from prospering.
[…] firms that do not make the grade should exit, freeing up resources for other uses" (Bernanke, 2010 ). State-aid control then allows for a Schumpeterian creative-destruction process in banking.
State aid may also enhance banks' risk-taking. If banks anticipate government bailouts, for example, they may undertake excessive risk (Cheng and Van Cayseele, 2009) . In this view, regulators should closely monitor beneficiary banks to prevent excessive risk-taking. However, Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010) show that state aid through government guarantees increases risk-taking in competing banks but not in beneficiary banks (except for banks with outright public ownership). They argue that beneficiary banks can compete more aggressively because they receive state aid, and, to cope with the pressure, competing banks become riskier. Distortionary-designed state aid may therefore increase risk-taking in the entire banking system. The findings of Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010) therefore indicate that beneficiary banks and their competitors need intense prudential supervision.
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According to Spector (2009) , state-aid control may help governments resist the lobbying pressure for bailouts, which is particularly strong given the adverse political consequences of bank failure (Brown and Dinç, 2005) . This calls for strong state-aid control in banking, shielded from political pressure. In the EU, a supranational authority may be better shielded from local political pressures and may therefore allocate state aid as well as apply stringent state-aid control better than national governments or local authorities. Notably, state aid in the EU is generally prohibited. The main intention of a state-aid control in the EU is to preserve competition and foster trade in the EU common market despite potential government intervention.
State-aid control should preserve a level playing field among the EU countries (Kroes, 2010 Though this state-aid control is crucial to establish common rules in EU countries and thereby foster competition and trade, sometimes government intervention is required to prevent market failures and ensure equitable economies. Thus, exemptions exist in Article 107(2) of the TFEU. In particular, state aid is compatible with the internal market if it has (a) "a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination to the origin of the products concerned;" if (b) the state aid is intended to repair "the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;" or (c) if the state aid is intended to overcome the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany. Although the European Commission conditionally approved the state aid, the compensatory measures were restrictive, involved asset divestment, and limited commercial activities (e.g., commitment not to act as a "primary dealer" for Austrian government bonds).
Competition policy in times of a financial crisis
Banking crises are costly events with repercussions for the economy at large, and several intervention mechanisms attempt to mitigate those consequences: central banks may act as lenders of last resort and provide liquidity support to illiquid banks; governments may grant substantial state aid to weak 15 banks; and regulators may unwind failed banks thorough liquidation, purchase and assumption agreements, or nationalization (see Marinč and Razvan, 2011) . These attempts to create financial stability, however, may create structural inefficiencies that damage competition and, therefore, conflict with competition policy.
Arguments for lax competition policy in times of a financial crisis
In times of a financial crisis, competition policy needs to deviate from the standard case scenario and support interventions necessary for the stability of the financial system. The task of competition policy, however, is to devise interventions that minimize long-term distortions of competition.
Liquidity support and state aid, for example, may conflict with state-aid control measures. Purchase and assumption agreements conflict with merger-control policies. Nationalizing a bank may create implicit government guarantees. General subsidy schemes may create barriers to entry. In some instances, therefore, competition policy in banking needs to be more lenient in a financial crisis than in times of financial stability.
In this regard, competition authorities should closely cooperate with prudential regulators.
Competition authorities also need to consider the positive externalities that bank stability brings (Fingleton, 2009 ). For example, state aid to a weak bank may positively affect competing banks through increased public confidence and a strengthened banking system. Hence, competition authorities should relax competition policy when the positive externalities of state aid may mitigate its anticompetitive effects.
A note of caution is warranted, of course. The positive spillovers of relaxed competition policy diminish during economic booms, but the structural problems it creates persist. 13 For these reasons, lax competition policy, if allowed, should only be temporary and should contain phase-out conditions. In addition, competition policy should distinguish between single bank failures and systemwide instability. When systemic stability is endangered, competition authorities could relax competition policy if short-term stability concerns outweigh long-term competition concerns.
14 Obviously, public confidence is crucial to safeguarding stability in banking. Illiquidity (e.g., due to bank run) may create short-term severe strains on banks that result in insolvency. Hence, 13 Cordella and Yeyati (2003) support conditioning bailout policies on economic downturns. Such conditioning decreases bank risk-taking by increasing the franchise value of banks.
14 In the long term, restricting banking competition during crises hurts consumers as well as the real economy. Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) show that forbearance of weak Japanese banks in the 1990s restricted interbank and interfirm competition and postponed economic recovery.
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interventions may supply liquidity. An example would be the central bank's intervention as lender of last resort so that short-term, liquidity-based interventions do not hurt long-term competition.
However, the argument presumes that it is easy to separate illiquid banks from insolvent banks. In reality, such a distinction is difficult to make. The competition authority should closely cooperate with the prudential regulator (or lender of last resort), which has more information/knowledge to determine whether the problem is illiquidity or insolvency.
Antitrust Enforcement and Crisis cartels
The European Commission took a stand against cartels during the global financial crisis and did not relax its antitrust enforcement in banking (EC, 2012).
In October 2011, the European Commission raided several financial institutions holding financial derivatives linked to EURIBOR. The concern was that the institutions had colluded and In some industries, the competition authority could also relax its antitrust enforcement by allowing for crisis cartels, which are cartels in which firms reduce overcapacity in a coordinated way over a limited time interval (see OECD, 2011, p. 109). The rationale is that, during crises, overcapacity may force firms to engage in costly price wars that may lead to massive exits from the industry. When the economy recovers, only a few firms are left and the market is less competitive than before. A temporary cartel may prevent the social problems associated with industry collapse and yields a more competitive market after the crisis. Unfortunately, this argument is easily abused (the prime reason the U.S. prohibits crisis cartels).
Several arguments raise doubt that crisis cartels help contain banking crises. First, the notion that crisis cartels reconstruct overcapacity does not hold in banking. In particular, in a crisis, banks do not engage in price wars to employ their lending overcapacities and force competitors to exit the market. In contrast, banks curtail lending, and competition for borrowers generally weakens because of enhanced information asymmetries on the market. State subsidies may even need to support bank lending (especially to informationally opaque borrowers, such as SMEs).
Second, it is hard to argue that banks engage in price wars in order to attract investors (e.g., depositors) and drive competitors out of the market. A war of attrition is common in stable, transparent, and symmetric market structures. In crisis times, however, banks avoid forcing competitors into bankruptcy, because the contagion of bank runs may lead to their own demise. For this reason, it is doubtful that a crisis cartel will contain widespread panic in the banking system.
During the global financial crisis, the European Commission took a clear stance against crisis cartels, arguing that in the short-term they harm consumers and in the long-term they do not benefit consumers or corporations (Kroes, 2010) . Banks involved in crisis cartels, after all, may coordinate to increase entry barriers and create structural distortions on a long-term basis.
Even though crisis cartels are explicitly prohibited, implicit crisis cartels may have occurred.
For example, the competition authority has prevented banks that obtain state aid from increasing their market share by engaging in price wars or price leadership. The aim is to prevent unfair competition via government support. However, conduct constraints such as price caps and market-share restrictions could impede competition. In particular, competing banks may respond by increasing prices themselves, thereby forming an implicit crisis cartel. Country schemes for state aid create another danger: preventing foreign expansion, which may appear as if a bank is exploiting a subsidy. The unintentional consequence is that banks anticipate no threat of entry, and competitive behavior is limited.
Another problem may occur in the most crisis-hit EU countries (so-called Programme countries). In these countries, banks may already be close to insolvency and if they are caught colluding, they may not be able to pay the fines.
The European Commission may consider this inability to pay an exceptional economic situation. 17 The purpose of the concept of the inability to pay is to prevent fines from driving a bank out of the market and causing adverse social and economic consequences. However, such concept may lower the ex-ante deterrent effect of antitrust legislation and may relax antitrust enforcement. Despite this concern, the number of requests for fine reductions due to the inability to pay actually decreased in 2011 (see EC, 2012c). In addition, competition authorities can impose other measures (e.g., behavioral measures) on colluding banks.
In summary, the European commission vigilantly enforced anti-cartel policies during the global financial crisis, but banks may now have higher incentives to engage in collusive practices.
Relaxed merger control
The European Commission kept its merger-control policies unchanged during the global financial crisis, but it also acknowledged that competition authorities can apply the rules flexibly in a deteriorated economic environment (Kroes, 2010) .
For example, the European Commission argues that during a financial crisis the criteria for the failing-firm defense should be applied flexibly to deal with rapidly evolving market conditions. In particular, a bank failure during a crisis may create a systemic collapse of the banking system. Thus, it might be easier to prove that the competitive conditions resulting from a rescue merger will not be worse than the competitive conditions resulting from a systemic failure in the absence of the merger (see OECD, 2009, p. 188) . The European Commission, however, demands that even in a financial crisis a rescue merger must lead to efficiency gains in comparison to other means of restructuring failing banks. In this sense, the distinction between long-term viable and nonviable banks is crucial and the need to merge one or more nonviable banks is questionable from an efficiency point of view. , 2010b) . The majority of that state aid was concentrated in schemes with unlimited participation; less went to ad hoc interventions in individual financial institutions. The aid consisted mainly of guarantees, and to a lesser extent recapitalization measures, asset-relief interventions, and liquidity measures (guarantees excluded). The maximum approved volumes were higher than the actual use of aid (see Figure 2 ).
The problem may be that high concentrations in retail banking markets, substantial government ownership, and implicit bailout guarantees may distort competition on a long-term basis.
The competition authority must phase out state aid in a way that diminishes excessive government involvement in banking. Second, a TBTF bank is now a larger bank that can better exploit market-power rents. These results indicate that the too-big-to-fail issue cannot be completely disentangled from antitrust or competition policy. These results also point to the importance of merger control in EU banking. State aid may be superior to relaxed merger control in the EU for several other reasons. First, a merger may deliver limited efficiency gains. Recent research suggests that the most value-enhancing mergers are ones with both a geographic and activity focus. In the fragmented EU banking system, the efficiency gains may thus be more limited. A merger is also an (almost) irreversible process and may distort competition in the long term. This is particularly worrisome in the EU, where only mergers within national markets may be viable in a crisis. This may lead to the creation of national champions and may further aggravate fragmentation in European banking.
State aid can and should be designed with an exit option in mind (Maes and Kiljanski, 2009 ).
State aid should also coordinate with financial and corporate restructuring. Bailout provisions should ensure that shareholders, junior bondholders, and managers share the losses, thereby limiting taxpayer losses. Corporate restructuring may enhance the long-term viability of a beneficiary bank. Forced divestments also mitigate the TBTF problem (Vives, 2011) . In contrast, lax merger control by definition gives the competition authority only limited control over the merged entity.
The interaction between competition policy and regulatory and supervisory framework in EU banking
The key to successful crisis resolution may not reside in stricter or more relaxed competition policy.
Instead, it may rest in a strengthened regulatory and supervisory framework. With this point in mind, we assess EU competition policy.
In the absence of a common EU framework for bank restructuring and resolution, it was necessary to relax competition policy and to strengthen the stability of banking systems through infusions of state aid during the global economic crisis. However, we argue that competition authorities cannot overtake the functions of bank regulators and bank supervisors. An overhaul of the EU framework for bank regulation and supervision is necessary (and is already being implemented).
The new EU banking union will consist of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (which confers supervisory tasks to the ECB). The Single Supervisory Mechanism will enable the European Stability
Mechanism to recapitalize banks directly.
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In addition, the common EU regulatory framework should improve its capital regulation (CDR 4 proposal), harmonization of deposit-guarantee strategies, and create a common EU framework for bank resolution and restructuring, including establishing a single resolution authority. In these areas, the EU is lagging significantly behind the U.S. (see Bliss and Kaufman, 2011 for the U.S. approach toward resolving insolvent large, complex financial institutions).
We acknowledge that competition authorities have several advantages over regulators in ensuring competitive conduct (see Hellwig, 2009 (Lyons, 2009) . In short, 18 See press release 17739/12 of the Council on 13.12.2012, "Council agrees position on bank supervision." 19 Carletti, Ongena, and Hartmann (2009) further support the separation. They provide evidence that competition policy is valuable for banks as it acts as a controlling mechanism for prudential regulation. 27 divestments may restore market structure, but not the level of competition (Davies and Lyons, 2007) .
In particular, the acquirers of divested assets may not be willing to invest in the divested business.
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In these situations, competition authorities should use behavioral rules such as price or marketshare restrictions, or restrictions on bankers' salaries and bonuses. However, this may bring further inefficiencies. Restrictions on salaries may limit a weak bank's ability to attract the best employees, for example The European Commission can decide on the measure and use the underlying rationale for justification, giving it substantial discretion. Certain levels of discretion may positive. In the unprecedented global financial crisis, for example, large-scale governmental interventions preserved financial stability. However, discretion may also put lobbying and political pressure on the competition authority. For example, Lannoo, Napoli, and Sutton (2010) argue that some countries (e.g., large ones, such as France) and banks were better aware of the EU's state-aid control rules and were thus able to obtain better treatment than were other countries and banks. The different abilities among EU countries may have magnified this inequality.
Competition authorities may also lack sufficient knowledge to achieve all the objectives in place, making cooperation with prudential regulators necessary. Lannoo, Napoli, and Sutton (2010) are concerned, for instance, that the European Commission favored industrial policy in its competition control. For example, the European Commission agreed on large state aid to ING despite the company's strong position in the Dutch retail banking market. The rationale was that divestments of noncore assets were sufficient to compensate for rather small divestments in core operations.
Such a decision goes to the heart of the question, which business model is correct in banking?
In this view, the European Commission has made industrial-policy decisions that might have better been made by prudential regulators with more specialized knowledge about banking. In particular, the prudential regulator could better design remedies that increase the long-term efficiency of the banking industry. The prudential regulator also has better knowledge and timely information about systemic risk. This indicates that the EU could have managed its financial crisis better by stipulating more communication between competition authorities and bank regulators.
EU law gives decision-making authority regarding state-aid control solely to the European
Commission. This does not mean that decision-making and cooperation cannot expand to other EU bodies (e.g., the ECB, ECOFIN Council, and Parliament). Although consultations between the European Commission and other EU bodies about state-aid control were scarce at the beginning of the global financial crisis (Lannoo, Napoli, and Sutton, 2010) , this may have changed lately. For example, there is more coordination now regarding restructuring banking systems in crisis-hit countries (see the case of recapitalization of Spanish banks; MEMO/12/918, 28.11.2012 ).
Unification of these actions under the umbrella of the European Commission may have been justifiable in the absence of the EU-wide regulatory body during the global financial crisis. However, there is no time for complacency. It may be wise to limit the objective of competition policy to preserving competition, whereas other objectives (e.g., moral-hazard control, stability of the financial system) should be the responsibility of the EU bank regulators and supervisors, such as EBA and ECB. However, this can only be successful if the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in EU banking are enhanced.
Prudential regulation and supervision in banking are also substantially intertwined with competition policy during noncrisis times. Without the prudential regulator, banks can ride on implicit and explicit guarantees (e.g., deposit insurance, bailout policies) and engage in unfair competition by undertaking excessive risks. 21 Prudential regulation should remove fly-by-night operators from the banking system and, by doing so, restore a level playing field and harness fair competition. In this way, stronger regulatory frameworks foster competition among banks. All in all, bank regulators and competition authorities must cooperate in crisis and non-crisis times. 21 For example, before its collapse the Icelandic bank Landsbanki raised €1.7b in approximately 130,000
accounts after five months of doing business in the Netherlands (de Moor, du Perron, and Krop, 2009, pp. 54, 56 ).
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Conclusions
Competition policy in banking should become more lenient during severe financial crises if doing so preserves financial stability. Competition authorities should support interventions that safeguard stability of frail banking systems, even if doing so temporarily worsens competition. The main responsibility for bank stability, however, falls to bank regulators. In this light, the framework for bank regulation, supervision, and resolution needs to improve and become more coordinated across the EU countries. Banking regulatory and supervisory authorities (e.g., the EBA and ECB) and the European Commission should closely cooperate to safeguard stability and simultaneously prevent protectionism in European banking.
In the face of financial crisis, competition policy must also mitigate long-term competitive distortions. Competition authorities should avoid encouraging crisis cartels but apply state-aid control more leniently in a widespread banking crisis. Despite its higher public costs, state aid may be less damaging to long-term competition in the EU than relaxed merger control and may therefore be a better option. In particular, relaxed merger control could help create national champions, which further divide an already fragmented European banking market.
In the last global financial crisis, the European Commission preserved its anti-cartel policy and applied merger policy, but it pursued lenient state-aid control. This permitted EU countries to intervene in and safeguard the stability of their banking systems. State-aid control applied to a number of state-aid cases, largely preserving a competitive, level playing field between banks and banking systems. Although massive state-aid interventions encouraged more relaxed competition policy, competition in banking was-and still is-not a sin. Enhanced regulatory and supervisory frameworks can facilitate the application of competition policy in banking, and, as we have seen, the cooperation among bank regulators, supervisors, and competition authority has become indispensable.
